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Abstract—Participatory crowd sensing social systems rely on
the participation of large number of individuals. Since humans
are strategic by nature, effective incentive mechanisms are needed
to encourage participation. A popular mechanism to recruit
individuals is through referrals and passive incentives such as
geometric incentive mechanisms used by the winning team in the
2009 DARPA Network Challenge and in multi level marketing
schemes. The effect of such recruitment schemes on the effort
put in by recruited strategic individuals is not clear. This paper
attempts to fill this gap. Given a referral tree and the direct
and passive reward mechanism, we formulate a network game
where agents compete for finishing crowd sensing tasks. We
characterize the Nash equilibrium efforts put in by the agents
and derive closed form expressions for the same. We discover free
riding behavior among nodes who obtain large passive rewards.
This work has implications on designing effective recruitment
mechanisms for crowd sourced tasks. For example, usage of
geometric incentive mechanisms to recruit large number of
individuals may not result in proportionate effort because of
free riding.
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread presence of smart phones, wearables, GPS
devices and other hand held sensors have enabled individuals
to collect valuable data from their surrounding environments.
Analyzing such crowd sensed data can help monitor urban and
industrial pollution levels [1], improve our understanding of
urban traffic patterns [2], and can even prove to be useful for
surveillance and emergency response [3]. Some crowd sensing
tasks, such as traffic monitoring, can be performed using
opportunistic sensing that does not actively involve the user,
while others such as pollution monitoring or surveillance may
require active participation of the user [4]. Such participatory
sensing systems, due to the human in the loop, raises unique
challenges such as recruiting and incentivizing a large number
of individuals to participate in the sensing activity.
Offering referral rewards for recruiting friends to sign up for
completing a task is widely used in multi level marketing [5].
Such mechanisms generate referral trees where a parent node
represents an individual that has recruited or referred another
individual who is represented as a child to the referring parent
node. In such schemes, apart from rewarding individuals for
finishing the tasks, additional rewards, in the form of incen-
tives, are provided to encourage individuals to recruit people
from their social connections. A popular strategy is to provide
a proportion of the reward earned by recruited individuals to
the recruiting individual recursively. Such mechanisms, where
the parent node obtains a proportion of the reward earned by
the child nodes, are termed as geometric incentive mechanisms
[5] and such indirect rewards are called passive rewards.
Geometric incentive mechanisms have also been used with
success in participatory crowd sourcing tasks. The team that
won the 2009 DARPA Network Challenge used a geometric
incentive mechanism to recruit a large number of volunteers
to complete the task [6]. The challenge involved locating the
positions of 10 large red weather balloons scattered in the
continental United States in the shortest possible time [6].
The prize winning team developed a mechanism where an
individual who finds the location of the balloon passes half of
her reward to her parent (recruiter), who in turn passes half
of it to her parent, and so on. Thus, an ancestor who is k hop
away from the node who finished the task gets 12k+1 part of
the reward (the mechanism may restrict reward sharing to only
a few levels). A mathematical analysis of the of this strategy
revealed that for a rational individual recruiting the maximum
number of people she knows is the best response strategy [7].
Clearly for such a large search task, a large number of
recruits is key. However, that is not the only important factor;
the efforts put in by those individuals to finish the task is
equally critical. Particularly, the incentive mechanism which
was used to recruit individuals should also ensure that it
does not disincentivize individuals to work hard. The effect
of geometric incentive mechanisms, that were used to recruit
individuals, on the efforts put in by them to finish the task is
not clear. In this paper we aim to fill that gap.
By formulating a network game we show the effect geo-
metric incentive mechanisms have on the efforts put in by
rational agents to finish the task. We analyze the behavior of
agents connected over a referral network (tree) and compute
an equilibrium effort profile. Our analysis technique is game
theoretic, i.e., we model each individual as a strategic agent
who wants to maximize her utility in a given situation. The
equilibrium we consider is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(PSNE), and we show that it always exists and is unique for
interesting model parameters. More importantly, our results
show that while geometric incentive schemes are an excellent
tool for recruiting individuals they may indeed disincentivize
a few individuals from putting any effort.
II. MODEL
A. The Task Arrival and Processing Model
Let the set of individuals be denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n},
and connected over a hierarchical directed tree T . The di-
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rection of the edges are from the root towards the leaves.
We assume that if an individual performs a crowd sourced
task, she gets a direct incentive, and the nodes along the path
from the individual to the root receive an indirect incentive.
We assume that the tasks arrive at a Poisson rate λ, which
is a common knowledge, and are queued up until served.
We assume that each agent competes for the task (as is the
case in multi level marketing and the 2009 DARPA Network
Challenge). Each node i attempts to capture a task from the
work queue according to a Poisson process with rate λi. If
the total reward of a task is R, we assume that a node gets a
direct incentive of γ ·R if she grabs the job (γ ∈ (0, 1)), with
the rest shared as indirect incentives. The cost of maintaining
an attempt rate λi is C ·λi, where C > 0 is a known constant.
The task is assigned exclusively to the agent who attempts it
first after the task arrives. We assume the agents have uniform
skill of performing a task. The time to complete a task is small
compared to the inter-attempt times of any agent and hence
the task completion time is ignored.
We can model the task arrival and departure in a server-
queue model where the arrival rate is λ(> 0) and the
consolidated service rate of the entire network is
∑
j∈N λj ,
because the superposition of Poisson processes is Poisson with
the rate being the sum of the rates [8]. When agent i tries to
capture a job from the task queue, the probability that she can
grab the job is given by λi/
∑
j∈N λj . This is because the
inter-attempt times are exponentially distributed for a Poisson
process, and using the memoryless property of exponential
random variables [9]. There are two regimes the system could
operate in.
Case 1: When
∑
j∈N λj > λ, the queueing process is a
positive recurrent Markov chain and all tasks will be served,
and the output process would also be Poisson with rate λ
(Burke’s Theorem [8]), the rate at which agent i would grab
the task is therefore given by λ · λi/
∑
j∈N λj . Hence, the
direct reward to i is λγR · λi/
∑
j∈N λj .
Case 2: When
∑
j∈N λj ≤ λ, the queueing process is a null or
transient Markov chain and with high probability (probability
approaching unity) the queue will be non-empty at a steady
state [9]. In such a setting, any agent i who attempts to grab a
task actually gets a task, and hence the direct reward of agent
i would be γR · λi.
If a node j hits a task, she receives a ‘direct’ reward, and
each node i on the directed path from the root to j receives
an ‘indirect’ reward. Since the efforts are costly (Cλi), each
agent has to decide on the efforts to maximize her net payoff,
i.e., (direct + indirect) reward minus the cost. If there are
indirect rewards, a node will reduce efforts to reduce costs.
This induces a game between the nodes. The strategy of player
i is to choose the attempt rate λi ∈ Si = [0,∞). In the
following section, we derive an expression for the expected
utility for an agent i.
B. Indirect Reward and the Utility Model
The task arrival process and its incentive sharing scheme
induce competition among the nodes. Direct incentives are
earned when an agent grabs a task.
The indirect incentives are shared with other players as
specified by the reward sharing matrix ∆ = [δij ] where δij
is the fraction of the total reward received by i when j grabs
the task. Note that δii = γ, ∀i ∈ N . Since the network is a
directed tree, if j does not appear in subtree of i then δij = 0.
We call the matrix ∆ monotone non-increasing if δij > δij′ ,
whenever the hop-distance distT (i, j) < distT (i, j′), and
anonymous if the δij depends only on the distance of i and j
on T , distT (i, j), and not on the identities of the nodes. Hence
these are reasonable assumptions to make.
While some of our results extend to general networks and
general ∆ matrices, in this paper, we focus on monotone non-
increasing and anonymous reward sharing matrices. To ensure
that the total reward is bounded above by R, we assume∑
k∈N δkj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ N . Let us denote Ti as the subtree
rooted at i. Combining the direct and indirect rewards and
costs, the expected utility of agent i ∈ N given by,
ui(λi, λ−i) =
{
ui,1(λi, λ−i),
∑
k∈N λk > λ,
ui,2(λi, λ−i),
∑
k∈N λk ≤ λ,
(1)
where λ−i = (λ1, . . . , λi−1, λi+1, . . . , λn), and,
ui,1(λi, λ−i) := λγR
λi∑
k∈N λk
+ λR
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δij
λj∑
k∈N λk
− Cλi, (2)
ui,2(λi, λ−i) := γRλi + λR
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλj − Cλi. (3)
In both (2) and (3), the first term on the RHS denotes the
expected utility of agent i due to her own effort λi, the second
term denotes the indirect utility coming from the efforts λj of
all the nodes j ∈ Ti \ {i}, and the third term denotes the cost
to maintain the effort. The utility model is parametrized by
the reward R, reward sharing matrix ∆, cost C, and tree T .
C. Effort Sharing and Effort Zones
The effort sharing function f is a recursive function, which
is computed for a given tree T and a reward sharing matrix
∆, in a bottom up fashion, i.e., from the leaves towards the
root. Let us denote the set of directed trees by T . For any tree,
f is initialized to 1 for all the leaves, and then computed as
follows.
Effort Sharing Function: A mapping f : T × [0, 1)n×n →
[0, 1] given by the recursive formula,
f(Ti,∆) = max
{
0, 1−
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δij · f(Tj ,∆)
}
. (4)
This function is maximum when i is a leaf, and decreases
for nodes with large subtrees below them (i.e., the ones
with large passive rewards). In Sec. III we will see that, for
interesting model parameters, the effort equilibrium levels are
proportional to this function, leading to smaller effort levels
for nodes with large subtrees below them. Based on this we
partition the space of parameters V := {v = (R,∆, C, T )}
into four regions:
Region I: R1 =
{
v : γ·R
C
∈ [0, 1)
}
(5)
Region II: R2 =
{
v : γ·R
C
= 1
}
(6)
Region III: R3 =
{
v : γ·R
C
∈
(
1,
∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)−1
]}
(7)
Region IV: R4 =
{
v : γ·R
C
>
∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)−1
}
(8)
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Fig. 1: Graphical illustration of the parameter space and the Nash
equilibria characterization.
We will analyze PSNE effort profiles for the game in the
whole parameter space. We will see in Sec. III that the game
exhibits different behavior in each of these regions (and hence
the regions are divided in this way).
Effort Zones: We partition the space of agents’ effort profile
L := {λ = (λ1, . . . , λn)} into four regions:
Z1 =
{
λ :
∑
j∈N λj < λ
}
Zone 1, (9)
Z2 =
{
λ :
∑
j∈N λj = λ
}
Zone 2, (10)
Z3 =
{
λ ∈ Z2 : λi +
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλj
≥ λ
(
1− C
γR
)
, ∀ i ∈ N
}
Zone 3, (11)
Z4 =
{
λ :
∑
j∈N λj > λ
}
Zone 4. (12)
Notice that Z3 ⊆ Z2. We define it separately to show a result
that characterizes the set of Nash equilibria for region R3. If
we consider a single server abstraction of the entire network,
then the arrival rate λ sees a consolidated service rate of∑
i∈N λi. If the service rate is smaller, equal, or larger than the
arrival rate, then according to the conditions (9–12), the task
queue would be either over loaded (Zone 1), critically loaded
(Zone 2, Zone 3), or under loaded (Zone 4) respectively.
The crowd sourcing manager would like to operate in Z4, so
that over a long period of time, all incoming tasks are served
and there is no accumulation of tasks.
We see from (1) that the zones correspond to different utility
structures,
(i) ui(λ) = uTi,1(λ), if λ ∈ Z4; (ii) ui(λ) = uTi,2(λ), if
λ ∈ Z1 ∪ Z2.
In the following section, we show that in each of the regions
R1 to R4, the PSNE are mapped to the zones Z1 to Z4,
sometimes uniquely. The PSNE always exists, which is a non-
trivial result. Fig. 1 graphically illustrates the parameter space
and the main results on the characterization of the equilibria
(detailed analysis is carried out in Sec. III). It gives the
intuition that since the reward to cost ratio R/C is small in
regions R1 to R3, the sum of the equilibrium efforts could fall
below the incoming rate λ. However, in region R4, the R/C
ratio is large enough to ensure a unique PSNE, in which the
sum equilibrium effort can efficiently serve the incoming task
stream.
III. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
We compute the PSNE for the four regions R1 to R4 in
Eqn (5)–(8) (hence a PSNE always exists). The results serve
to predict the efforts put in by strategic agents connected via
a network for the given reward sharing matrix ∆.
The first result shows that ui is concave in λi. This helps in
calculation of the PSNE as it is a utility maximization process
for all agents.
Lemma III.1. ui(λi, λ−i) is a concave function in λi.
Proof: We show this in two steps.
Step 1: ui,2(λi, λ−i) is a linear function in λi, which is
a special case of a concave function. Now we show that
ui,1(λi, λ−i) is concave in λi. Differentiating Eq. (2),
∂
∂λi
ui,1(λi, λ−i) =
λγR
(∑
j 6=i λj−
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλj
)
(
∑
j∈N λj)
2 − C (13)
and by taking the second derivative we get,
∂2
∂λ2i
ui,1(λi, λ−i) =
−2λγR
(∑
j 6=i λj−
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλj
)
(
∑
j∈N λj)
3 (14)
Since λi ≥ 0 ∀i,
(∑
j 6=i λj −
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλj
)
≥ 0, this is
due to the fact that δij ∈ [0, 1) and |{j ∈ N : j 6= i}| ≥
|Ti \ {i}|. Hence, ui,1(λi, λ−i) is concave in λi.
Step 2: We observe that, ui(λi, λ−i) =
min{ui,1(λi, λ−i), ui,2(λi, λ−i)}. This is because that when
λ∑
j∈N λj
< 1, ui,1(.) < ui,2(.) and when λ∑
j∈N λj
≥ 1,
ui,1(.) ≥ ui,2(.) from Equations (1), (2) and (3). The function
ui(·) is the minimum of two concave functions and hence is
concave. 
The next result characterizes the PSNE in region R1.
Theorem III.2 (PSNE in R1). If v ∈ R1, then the PSNE
effort profile is unique, and is given by λ∗ = (0, . . . , 0).
Proof: When v ∈ R1, we argue that all players will put
zero effort in Nash Equilibrium. Suppose λ∗ ∈ Z4, it implies
ui(λ
∗) = ui,1(λ
∗). Taking derivative of the utility at λ∗, we
get,
∂
∂λ∗i
ui,1(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) =
λγR
(∑
j 6=i λ
∗
j −
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλ
∗
j
)
(∑
j∈N λ
∗
j
)
2
− C
=
(
λ∑
j∈N λ
∗
j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
·γR ·
(∑
j 6=i λ
∗
j −
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλ
∗
j
)
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
−C
< γR − C < 0.
This is a contradiction for λ∗ to be an equilibrium, since each
player i would be better off by decreasing their effort from λ∗i .
Hence λ∗ /∈ Z4. So, λ∗ ∈ Z1 ∪ Z2, which implies ui(λ∗) =
ui,2(λ
∗). But ∂
∂λi
ui,2 = γR − C < 0, since v ∈ R1. Thus
λ∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N . 
The intuition is that in R1, the reward to cost ration R/C
is small enough. Hence, no individual gets any positive payoff
by putting any positive effort. In R2, the R/C ratio reaches a
critical value, where there exists multiple PSNE. The agents
collectively are indifferent between just meeting the incoming
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rate λ and keeping the sum effort smaller than this. Hence we
get the following theorem.
Theorem III.3 (PSNE in R2). If v ∈ R2, then any λ∗ ∈
Z1 ∪ Z2 is a PSNE.
Proof: Case 1: Suppose λ∗ ∈ Z4. Then ui(λ∗) = ui,1(λ∗)
and we repeat the analysis of Theorem III.2 to show that
∂
∂λ∗
i
ui,1(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) < 0, ∀ i ∈ N , even for v ∈ R2. Hence it is
not an equilibrium as players will keep decreasing their efforts.
Case 2: When λ∗ ∈ Z1∪Z2, we have ui(λ∗) = ui,2(λ∗) and
∂
∂λ∗
i
ui,2(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) = 0, ∀ i ∈ N . Thus, ui(λi, λ∗−i) is constant
when
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j ≤ λ, for all i ∈ N . Hence each element of
the set Z1 ∪ Z2 is a PSNE. 
For the sake of convenience, we will discuss region R4,
before R3. In the final region R4, the ratio R/C crosses
a minimum threshold, which guarantees that the equilibrium
effort profile is unique and sufficient to serve the incoming
task rate, i.e.,
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j > λ. We show this using a few
intermediate lemmas.
Lemma III.4. If v ∈ R4, and if there exists a PSNE effort
profile λ∗, it cannot lie in Z1 ∪ Z2.
Proof: We prove this via contradiction. Suppose ∃ a PSNE
effort profile λ∗ ∈ Z1 ∪ Z2, i.e.,
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j ≤ λ. Hence
ui(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) = ui,2(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i), ∀ i ∈ N . But, ∂∂λiui,2(λ
∗) =
γR − C > 0, ∀ i ∈ N (differentiating Eq. (3)). This is
because, v ∈ R4 and from Eqn (8) we know that γRC >∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)−1
> 1. Hence, utility of i is increasing in λi
at λ∗. So, i is better off by increasing his effort from λ∗i ,
which is a contradiction to the fact that λ∗ is a PSNE. 
Corollary III.5. For v ∈ R4, if there exists a PSNE effort
profile λ∗ then ui(λ∗) = ui,1(λ∗), ∀ i ∈ N .
Lemma III.6. If the utility structure ui is given by ui,1, ∀ i ∈
N , then there exists a unique PSNE effort profile λ∗ given by,
λ∗i =
λγR
C
(∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)−1
(
∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆))
2
)
f(Ti,∆), ∀ i ∈ N, (15)
where the function f is defined in (4).
Proof: If a PSNE effort profile (λ∗i , λ∗−i) exists in
the given game, then it must satisfy, ui,1(λ∗i , λ∗−i) ≥
ui,1(λi, λ
∗
−i), ∀λi ∈ Si = [0,∞), ∀i ∈ N . This implies,
λ∗i = arg max
λi∈Si=[0,∞)
ui,1(λi, λ
∗
−i), ∀ i ∈ N .
Thus in order to find the Nash equilibrium we have to solve
the following optimization problem for each i ∈ N .
maxλi ui,1(λi, λ
∗
−i)
s.t. λi ≥ 0,
}
⇒
minλi −ui,1(λi, λ
∗
−i)
s.t. −λi ≤ 0
(16)
Due to concavity of ui,1, this is a convex optimization problem
with linear constraints, which can be solved using KKT
theorem. At the minimizer λ∗i of problem (16), ∃ µ ∈ R
such that, (i) µ ≥ 0, (ii) − ∂
∂λi
ui,1(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) − µ = 0, (iii)
−µλ∗i = 0, (iv) −λ∗i ≤ 0.
Case 1: µ > 0⇒ λ∗i = 0 and in this case ∂∂λi ui,1 = −µ ≤ 0.
Case 2: µ = 0 ⇒ ∂
∂λi
ui,1(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) = 0 and in this case
λ∗i ≥ 0. This leads us to (from Eq. (13)),
∑
j∈N
λ∗j


2
=
λγR
C

∑
j 6=i
λ∗j −
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
λ∗jδij

 (17)
For a given tree and its equilibrium profile λ∗, let
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j =
x (variable substitution), then manipulation of (17) leads to,
λ∗i +
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
λ∗j δij = x−
x2C
λγR
, ∀ i ∈ N (18)
We do another variable substitution to denote the RHS of Eqn
(18) by y (≥ 0 since LHS is ≥ 0). That is,
y = x−
x2C
λγR
. (19)
Lemma III.7. λ∗i = yf(Ti,∆), ∀i ∈ N .
Proof: We prove this claim via induction on the levels of T .
Let the depth of T be D.
From Eqn (18), λ∗i +
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλ
∗
j = y, ∀ i ∈ N . From
Cases 1 and 2 above,
λ∗i = max

0, y − ∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλ
∗
j

 ∀ i ∈ N (20)
Step 1: For an arbitrary node j at level D, from (20), λ∗j =
y. Hence, the proposition is true as f(Tj,∆) = 1 for a leaf.
Now, select an arbitrary node i (which is not a leaf) at level
D−1. From (20) we get, λ∗i = max(0, y−
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijy) =
ymax(0, 1−
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δij1) = yf(Ti,∆).
Step 2: Let λ∗j = yf(Tj,∆) be true for all nodes j upto
level D − l. Consider an arbitrary node i at level D − l − 1.
From (20) and (4),
λ
∗
i = max

0, y − ∑
j∈Ti\{i}
y · f(Tj ,∆)δij

 = yf(Ti,∆) (21)
which concludes the induction. 
To find an expression for PSNE we now evaluate y. The
sum of efforts of all the players is defined as x. Hence,
x = y
∑
j∈N f(Tj,∆). Substituting for y from (19) in this
expression and solving for x yields,
x =
∑
j∈N
λ∗j =
λγR
C
(∑
j∈N f(Tj,∆)− 1∑
j∈N f(Tj,∆)
)
(22)
Using (19) we get,
y =
λγR
C


∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)− 1(∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)
)
2

 (23)
Combining (23) and the claim above, the PSNE is given by,
λ
∗
i =
λγR
C


∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)− 1(∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)
)
2

 f(Ti,∆),∀ i ∈ N
KKT equations led to a unique solution of the optimization
problem, hence PSNE is unique. 
Theorem III.8 (PSNE in R4). If v ∈ R4, then there exists a
unique PSNE effort profile λ∗ given by Eqn (15), which lies
in Z4.
Proof: From Corollary III.5 when v ∈ R4, ui(λ∗) =
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ui,1(λ
∗). From Lemma III.6 with this utility function, the
unique PSNE effort profile is given by Eqn (15). We use this
expression to compute the sum
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j , and substitute the
value of γR/C from (8) to get ∑j∈N λ∗j > λ ⇒ λ∗ ∈ Z4.

In Z4, the sum of the equilibrium efforts is more than λ.
Hence, it shows that in order to meet the goal of efficiently
serving the incoming tasks, the reward to cost ratio has to
be above a threshold given by (8). We also see that when
the parameters are in R4, the equilibrium effort of agent i is
proportional to f(Ti,∆).
Now we discuss region R3. In region R3, the reward to
cost ratio is a little larger than R2. However, it is still not
enough to guarantee the sum equilibrium effort levels to cross
λ (which was the case in R4). In particular, we show that it
is necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium effort profile to
live in Z3. To show that we need Z3 to be nonempty.
Lemma III.9. If v ∈ R3, Z3 is nonempty.
Proof: The proof is constructive. Let us consider the follow-
ing summation: S = λ
(
1− C
γR
)∑
j∈N f(Tj,∆). Substitut-
ing C
γR
≥
∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)−1∑
j∈N f(Tj ,∆)
(using (7)), we get S ≤ λ. Now,
let us construct a λ, such that λi = λ
(
1− C
γR
)
f(Ti,∆) +
βi(λ−S), ∀ i ∈ N , where, βi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N and
∑n
i=1 βi = 1.
Hence, by construction,
∑
i∈N λi = λ⇒ λ ∈ Z2. We see that,
λi +
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλj =

f(Ti,∆) + ∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijf(Tj ,∆)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1, using definition of f from Eq. (4)
·λ
(
1 −
C
γR
)
+

βi + ∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijβj

 (λ − S)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ λ
(
1−
C
γR
)
So, λ ∈ Z3, hence Z3 is nonempty. 
Theorem III.10 (Necessary and Sufficient Condition for
PSNE in R3). If v ∈ R3, an effort profile λ∗ is a PSNE,
if and only if λ∗ ∈ Z3.
Proof: (⇐): We show that if λ∗ ∈ Z3, it is a PSNE. From
Lemma III.9, Z3 6= φ, so we can pick a λ∗ ∈ Z3. Since, λ∗ ∈
Z3 implies λ∗ ∈ Z2, the utility undergoes a transition at this
point, ui(λ∗i−, λ∗−i) = ui,2(λ∗i−, λ∗−i), and ui(λ∗i+, λ∗−i) =
ui,1(λ
∗
i+, λ
∗
−i). Since ui is continuous but not differentiable
at λ∗, we look at the left and right derivatives at this point.
∂
∂λ∗i
ui(λ
∗
i−, λ
∗
−i) =
∂
∂λ∗i
ui,2(λ
∗
i−, λ
∗
−i) = γR −C > 0,
∂
∂λ∗i
ui(λ
∗
i+, λ
∗
−i) =
∂
∂λ∗i
ui,1(λ
∗
i+, λ
∗
−i)
=
γR
(
λ− λ∗i −
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλ
∗
j
)
λ
− C ≤ 0
The first inequality comes because v ∈ R3. Since λ∗ ∈
Z3 ⊆ Z2, the equality in the third line comes by replacing∑
j∈N λ
∗
j = λ in Eq. (13), and the inequality in the third line
is obtained by reorganizing the expression in Eqn (11). Hence
for each agent i, the utility is maximized at λ∗, when other
players are playing the equilibrium strategy. So, λ∗ is a PSNE.
(⇒): We are given that v ∈ R3, and λ∗ is a PSNE. We first
show that λ∗ should necessarily be in Z2. We show this via
contradiction. Let us consider the two following cases.
Case 1: Let λ∗ be the PSNE if it exists such that λ∗ ∈ Z1,
that is,
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j < λ then, ui(λ
∗) = ui,2(λ
∗), ∀ i ∈ N . But,
∂
∂λi
ui,2(λ) = γ ·R−C > 0, ∀ i ∈ N (from (7)). Hence, utility
of i is increasing in λi at λ∗. So, i is better off by increasing
his effort from λi, which is a contradiction to the fact that λ∗
is a PSNE.
Case 2: Let λ∗ be the PSNE if it exists such that λ∗ ∈ Z3,
that is,
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j > λ then, ui(λ
∗) = ui,1(λ
∗), ∀ i ∈ N . Thus
Eqn (22) is valid. Using (7) in (22) we get ∑j∈N λ∗j ≤ λ
which is a contradiction. Hence, if the PSNE effort profile λ∗
exists, it must lie in Z2.
Now, since λ∗ ∈ Z2, the utility will have a transition at this
point. We know that λ∗ is a PSNE, hence the utility must be
maximized at this point for all agents i ∈ N , given that the
other agents stick to the equilibrium strategies. Hence, it must
hold that,
∂
∂λi
ui(λ
∗
i−, λ
∗
−i) =
∂
∂λi
ui,2(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) ≥ 0, and (24)
∂
∂λi
ui(λ
∗
i+, λ
∗
−i) =
∂
∂λi
ui,1(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i) ≤ 0. (25)
Condition (24) yields, γ ·R−C ≥ 0, which is satisfied since
v ∈ R3. Condition (25) yields,
γR
(
λ−λ∗i−
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλ
∗
j
)
λ
−
C ≥ 0, since we have shown that λ∗ ∈ Z2. Reorganizing
this inequality, we get, λ∗i +
∑
j∈Ti\{i}
δijλ
∗
j ≥ λ
(
1− C
γR
)
.
Hence, λ∗ ∈ Z3. 
To summarize this section, in the model considered, pure
strategy Nash equilibria always exist. The regions correspond
to different reward to cost ratio, and the results predict the
efforts expected from rational agents when the ratio lies in one
of these regions. It gives a measure of how large γR/C needs
to be in order to efficiently serve the incoming task process (to
operate in Z4). The results suggest that nodes having network
advantages due to recruiting other nodes free ride on others.
Thus, a geometric incentive mechanism may disincentivize
nodes that have large subtrees from putting efforts.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We numerically compute the PSNE (using Theorem III.8) to
illustrate the effect of the referral tree on individual efforts in
region R4 — the most interesting region where all incoming
tasks are served. We consider a referral tree shown in Fig.
2a. To illustrate the analytical results we enforce the structure
in Eqn (26) on the reward sharing matrix ∆ = [δij ]. This is
motivated by the geometric incentive mechanism used by the
winning team in the DARPA Network challenge [6].
δij =
{ (
1
a
)distT (i,j)+1
j ∈ Ti,
0 otherwise.
(26)
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(b) Effort and rewards, a = 2.
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(c) Effort and rewards, a = 3.
Fig. 2: Referral tree and PSNE effort/reward profiles for the referral tree shown in Fig.2a. λ = 0.2, R = 15, C = 1.
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Fig. 3: Mean sum effort vs. number of nodes for varying a. Trees are
generated randomly. Results obtained by averaging over 500 samples.
λ = 0.2, R = 15, C = 1.
Here, a > 1 and γ = δii = 1/a. The PSNE effort profiles and
expected utility are shown in Fig. 2b and Fig. 2c. As seen in
both the figures, node 2 who has three children does not put
any effort due to passive rewards. In the a = 2 case, node 4
does not put any effort, but when the passive reward is reduced
by increasing a to 3, node 4 puts in some effort. Although the
sum effort is higher when a = 2, the variability in the effort
among the nodes is also high compared to a = 3.
Fig. 3 illustrates the effect of a on sum effort. Trees were
generated randomly. To generate a tree of size N we carry
out the following process recursively. Given a tree of size
i, the (i + 1)th node chooses a parent at random from i
nodes to attach itself. We discover that the sum effort saturates
as number of nodes in the tree increases. This suggests
that recruiting large number of individuals using geometric
incentives may not yield proportional increase in productivity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we performed a game theoretic analysis on
the efforts put in by individuals recruited using a referral tree,
which is a popular crowd sensing mechanism for recruiting
individuals. We propose a queuing model with Poisson task
arrivals where agents compete to finish the task. Agents receive
not only direct rewards for finishing a task, but also indirect
rewards if any agent in their subtree finishes a task. We provide
a complete analysis and a closed form solution for all possible
system parameters. We compute the PSNE effort profile for
the complete parameter space and show that the PSNE always
exists. In some regions of the parameter space it is unique,
while in others it is not. Our results uncover free riding
behavior among nodes who obtain large passive rewards from
their subtrees. This has implications on crowd sourced tasks
such as the DARPA Network challenge. In particular, usage
of geometric incentive mechanisms to recruit large number of
individuals may not result in proportionate effort due to free
riding.
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